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I. INTRODUCTION
The interval between the last' and present Survey has been far
more active for the Legislature than for the courts. An attempt has here-
in been made to discuss both statutory and judicial developments pri-
marily from the standpoint of synthesis, as opposed to naked reporting.
Comments upon the wisdom of particular developments have been made
only where clearly appropriate.
II. LEGISLATION
Of the legislative innovations relating to the area of trusts, easily
the most significant of the survey period was the statutory provision
authorizing the creation of the land trust.' The section permits the trustee
of real property to be empowered to "protect, conserve and to sell, or
to lease, or to encumber, or otherwise to manage and dispose of the
real property . . . in the trust. Under the Act, those dealing with the
* Editor-in-Chief, University of Miami Law Review; Student Instructor in Research
and Writing for Freshmen. The author is indebted to Robert A. Jarvis, Jr., for his assistance
in the preparation of portions of this article.
1. Thomas, Trusts and Succession, 16 U. MIAMI L. REv. 581 (1961). This Survey
includes all subsequent cases reported through August, 1965.
2. FLA. STAT. § 689.071(1)-(6) (1963).
3. Id. at (1).
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trustee are under no duty to inquire beyond the face of the recorded trust
instrument as to either the extent of the trustee's authority or the interests
of the beneficiaries, and they may take the property acquired from the
trustee free of any limitations and interests which are not set forth
clearly in the recorded trust instrument. Another subsection of the Act
authorizes a provision making the beneficiaries' interest under such trust
agreement personalty.5 The Act is expressly exclusive, however, of the
provisions of section 689.07.6
The Legislature was far more active in the area of succession, than in
the area of trust legislation. In 1961 the period for bringing claims
against an estate, where notice to creditors had been published, was gen-
erally shortened by two months throughout. In 1963, the Legislature
enacted a period of grace for those claims arising against estates between
July 1, 1961 and July 1, 1963. It also placed upon the objector to any
claim an additional burden of serving notice of the objection on the
claimant within thirty days of the filing of the claim, upon penalty of
forfeiture of the objection for failure to so serve.8 The period for filing
claims against the statutory "small estate" was similarly shortened from
eight to six months, where notice has been filed and published. 9
The right to appeal orders or decrees of the county judge now lies in
the "appropriate district court of appeal" unless a direct appeal to the
supreme court is otherwise authorized under Article 5, section 4 of the
Florida Constitution. These appeals are governed by the Florida ap-
pellate rules, including the right to supersedeas. 0 A state agency may
now commence a caveat proceeding." When a resident or non-resident
(other than a corporate fiduciary) seeks letters upon an estate, he must,
in writing, designate, for purposes of service of process, an agent or
attorney who resides in the county where the administration is pending,
and must record his own address in the county judge's office. Thereafter,
service upon the designated agent or attorney shall be binding on the
personal representative for any suit arising out of the administration
of the estate. 2
The procedure for granting an extension of time to the widow faced
with the alternative of electing dower, was broadened to include exten-
sions justified upon a commensurate extension of time for the filing qf
4. Id. at (2) & (3).
5. Id. at (4).
6. Id. at (6).
7. FLA. STAT. § 733.16(3) (1963).
8. FLA. STAT. § 733.18(3) (1963).
9. FLA. STAT. § 735.03 (1963).
10. FLA. STAT. § 732.15 (1963). The provisions of this amended section rendered super-
fluous the provisions which comprised §§ 732.16-.20, which were, therefore, repealed.
11. FLA, STAT. § 732.29 (1963).
12. FLA. STAT. § 732.15 (1965).
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objections to the claims of creditors or suits thereon, and an additional
ten days was added onto the previous sixty day period within which the
widow must elect after the resolution of any one of these enumerated
disputes relating to the estate. 3 Where the widow dies during the period
for her election, her beneficiaries are no longer given the opportunity to
seek an election in their own interests.
14
When the sale of estate property is authorized in the will of the
decedent, the power to so dispose of the property will only vest in the
named executor(s), absent an apparent intention to create an impersonal
power to dispose, otherwise evidenced by the decedent. 5 When the estate
property included stock or shares in a mutual fund, the courts were pre-
viously authorized to approve the holding of the stock or shares in the
sole name of the personal representative;'" where that is done, the per-
sonal representative becomes personally liable to the estate for any
negligent acts or omissions in regard to the stock." In 1965, this authori-
zation was broadened to include "registered bonds, notes, debentures, or
revenue certificates issued by any corporation, government, municipality,
or subdivisions or agencies thereof."' 8
An altogether new statute was enacted governing testamentary dona-
tions or bequests of parts of the decedent's body.'
Substantial alterations occurred with reference to the distribution
of property of a decedent. The Uniform Principal and Income Law2"
is now applicable to the principal and income of all estates of decedents
entered into probate after July 1, 1965.21 Major alterations, too lengthy
to develop here fully, affected: the transfer of assets in land to a surviving
spouse;22 the apportionment of estate taxes;23 the order in which the
assets of an estate are to be appropriated; 24 the liability for payment of
mortgages on devised realty; 25 the procedure for final settlement of the
estate and discharge of the personal representative; 2" and the disposition
of any unclaimed funds held by a personal representative.2 7 A new provi-
sion was also enacted to govern the distribution of income tax refunds
13. FLA. STAT. § 731.35(2) (1965).
14. FLA. STAT. § 731.35(3) (1965). This was accomplished by re-enacting only the
first sentence in subsection (3).
15. FLa. STAT. § 733.22 (1965).
16. With or without disclosing the fiduciary capacity.
17. FLA. STAT. § 733.361 (1963).
18. FLA. STAT. § 733.361 (1965).
19. FLA. STAT. § 736.18 (1963), as amended by a new subsection (7) (1965).
20. FLa. STAT. § 733.011 (1965).
21. FLA. STAT. ch. 690 (1965).
22. FLa. STAT. § 734.031 (1965).
23. FLA. STAT. § 734.041 (1963) as amended 1965.
24. FLA. STAT. § 734.05 (1965).
25. FaA. STAT. § 734.051 (1965).
26. FLA. STAT. § 734.22 (1965).
27. Fia. STAT. § 734.221 (1965).
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paid the estate of a decedent which estate falls within the exemptions of
the statutory "small estate."2
III. TRUSTS
A. Express Trusts
There are two general categories of trusts which are relevant for the
purposes of determining the effectiveness of any attempted creation of a
trust. The inter vivos trust is far simpler to create than its counterpart,
the testamentary trust. Inasmuch as the testamentary trust is a dispo-
sition after death, it must, if it is to be properly created and valid, con-
form in all respects to the requirements of the Statute of Wills.2" In
Valdez v. Muniz, 0 the court was confronted with a fact pattern which
called upon it to characterize a purported trust as either inter vivos or
testamentary. The decedent had told a debtor, when the debtor offered
to pay, that he did not need the money at the time. The decedent said
that he would ask for it if he did need it, and that if he died prior to such
a request, the debtor should hold the money in trust for the decedent's
grandson. This declaration was placed in issue as purportedly creating
an inter vivos trust. The court held, however, that it was merely an at-
tempted creation of a testamentary trust which had failed to meet the
strict formal requirements of a testamentary disposition.
Presented with a complicated tripartite trust agreement, with inter-
locking survivors, the court in First Nat'l Bank v. Kerness,81 was called
upon to discuss the prerequisites to dissolution of an irrevocable trust.
The court re-enuciated the general proposition that only in exceptional
cases will a court order the dissolution of a trust prior to a designated
point of expiration. Here the plaintiff had attempted to obtain dissolution
on a theory of consent of all the interested parties. In rejecting the at-
tempt, the court accented the failure of the plaintiff to satisfy all req-
uisites of proof by restating the language first employed in Byers v.
Beddow :32
There was a larger class where the court would decree dissolu-
tion of the trust on the application of all the interested parties,
but this was strictly limited to cases where the whole design and
object of the trust scheme had been practically accomplished,
and all of the interests created by it had become vested, and all
of the parties beneficially interested desired its termination. 8
Here, sufficient parties had not so indicated their intention, nor had the
trust purpose been practically accomplished.
28. FLA. STAT. § 735.15 (1965).
29. FLA. STAT. § 731.07 (1965).
30. 164 So.2d 876 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964).
31. 142 So.2d 777 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962).
32. 106 Fla. 166, 142 So. 894 (1932), dted at 142 So.2d 780.
33. Id. at 168, 142 So. at 896.
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In Hexter v. Gautier,4 the Florida Supreme Court characterized the
interest of a beneficiary as vested, subject to divestment, rather than
contingent, so as to make the interest amenable to intangible property
tax assessment. The interest was one which gave the beneficiary a life
estate, with a power to dispose of the corpus by will if: (1) he was over
forty years of age at death; and (2) he left no natural lineal descendants,
or their issue.
B. Resulting Trusts
The resulting trust is a creature of equity, established on the basis
of the implied intent of the parties, drawn from the circumstances. Gen-
erally speaking, there are three situations within which a resulting trust
may arise. One such circumstance is an ineffective attempt to create a
trust where a corpus remains unprovided for. 5 Another circumstance
giving rise to a resulting trust is the termination of a trust through the
fulfillment of its purpose at a time at which part of the corpus remains
unprovided for. A final circumstance which may give rise to a resulting
trust is the purchase money resulting trust, wherein a trust is presumed
from the circumstance of one purchasing property with his own money,
but in another's name.
The resulting trust is not, however, a general equity device to be
employed loosely in an effort to work fairness. Thus in Grapes v.
Mitchell,3 6 the supreme court refused to establish a resulting trust where
the parties had failed in an attempt to prove an express trust. The cir-
cumstances did not fit into any one of the three limited circumstantial
categories which may give rise to a resulting trust. In the Grapes case,
the circumstances were those of a gift over to a father, with an alleged
understanding that the gift was to be held in trust for the children.
Inasmuch as the trust is implied, rather than expressed, the affect of
presumptions and burdens of proof play an especially strong part in the
determination of the cases. When the facts presented by the record show
that all prerequisite circumstances are present to satisfy one of the three
instances in which a resulting trust may arise, a presumption arises in
favor of the existence of the trust and it can only be rebutted by "strong
and convincing evidence." Thus in Tomayko v. Thomas,'7 the naked
allegation that funds deposited in a joint savings account were the sub-
ject matter of a gift was inadequate to rebut the presumption of a result-
ing trust when it was otherwise proper to imply the existence of a
resulting trust. Similiarly, in Cook v. Katiba,3 8 the court sustained a com-
34. 153 So.2d 713 (Fla. 1963).
35. Watson v. St. Petersburg Bank & Trust Co., 146 So.2d 383 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962).
36. 159 So.2d 465 (Fla. 1964).
37. 144 So.2d 335 (3d Dist. 1962), cert. discharged, 151 So.2d 272 (Fla. 1963).
38. 152 So.2d 504 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1963).
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plaint, under attack on a motion to dismiss for its failure to state a
cause of action, where the allegations asserted facts sufficient to satisfy
the circumstances requisite to the imposition of a purchase money result-
ing trust in a parcel of land on an estoppel theory. However, in Jones v.
Jones, 9 the court pointed out that there need be a showing "by evidence
so strong, clear and unequivocal as to remove from the mind of the
Chancellor any reasonable doubt as to the existence of the [purchase
money resulting] trust.""0 Thus, that court reversed the Chancellor's
finding that there was such a showing because the proof was only "sub-
stantial." Evidently, it was not substantial enough.
It cannot be forgotten, however, that the resulting trust is the tool
of equity, and thus it will not be imposed, despite a clear proof of the
requisite circumstances, when the interests of innocent third parties would
suffer.4 ' Conversely, absent those same equities, the resulting trust will
be imposed to determine the rights of parties where there has been a
good faith attempt to establish a trust which has failed.
C. Constructive Trusts
The constructive trust is a creature of equity imposed in certain
circumstances, such as those wherein it can prevent fraud. In Botsikas v.
Yarmack,42 the court chose to extend the application of the constructive
trust to prevent unjust enrichment arising out of an alleged abuse of a
confidential relationship. Thus, the court reversed a dismissal for the
failure of a complaint to set forth a cause of action where it was alleged
that the plaintiff had been induced to contribute toward the purchase
price of certain property as a result of her confidence in the decedent.
Under these circumstances, the decedent's estate would have been un-
justly enriched. The court felt that this allegation, if proven, would
justify the imposition of the constructive trust over the property in ques-
tion.
It is clear, however, that the constructive trust will not be employed
merely to save an otherwise unsuccessful attempt to impose a resulting
trust. Thus in Dames v. Dames,4 the court first refused to impose a
purchase money resulting trust because the husband-wife relationship
created the presumption that property paid for by one is taken in the
other's name as a gift. The court went further, and held that absent an
adequate showing of fraud, the asserted interest of the other spouse could
not be imposed by the device of the constructive trust.
39. 140 So.2d 318 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962).
40. Id. at 320, citing Goldman v. Olsen, 159 Fla. 435, 31 So.2d 623 (1947).
41. Watson v. St. Petersburg Bank & Trust Co., supra note 35; Prescott v. Kreher,
153 So.2d 319 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963).
42. 172 So.2d 277 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
43. 149 So.2d 570 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963).
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When the property interest which one acquires is limited by statute,
he takes it subject, at the very least, to a constructive trust which con-
forms his interest to the scope set forth in the statute. Thus a co-parcener
who re-acquired property after a Murphy Act44 violation, for non-payment
of taxes, was held in Albury v. Gordon4" to have acquired the property
subject to a constructive trust in favor of the co-parcener. The relevant
statute precludes one co-parcener from re-acquiring such property as
against another co-parcener. Moreover, the constructive trust, as a crea-
ture of equity, is not subject to any restriction in the form of a statute of
limitations. Its life may be cut off by laches, but the mere passage of time
is ordinarily insufficient to establish a defense of laches. An injury to
an intervening equity need be shown.
D. The Land Trust Act
In Grammer v. Roman,48 the court held that the recently enacted
Florida Land Trust Act 47 was a remedial statute such as justifies its broad
and liberal construction and therefore afforded it retroactive effect.
E. Powers and Duties of the Trustee
In Baum v. Corn,48 an action was brought by corporation sharehold-
ers seeking an accounting by their trustee and the cancellation of a
mortgage executed by him. The complaint alleged that the corporation
president, who held legal title to certain land as trustee for the corporation,
had improperly mortgaged the land. In sustaining the complaint, the court
re-enunciated the view that a trustee has no authority to convey or en-
cumber the corpus absent a special grant of such authority in the trust
agreement. However, the court did point out that opposite result might
occur where the shareholders were shown to have known or to have been
under a duty to know of the mortgage, and hence under a duty to protect
both the corpus and all parties involved. The mere acquiescence of the
shareholders in the trustee's possession of legal title was inadequate, in
and of itself, to establish such an estoppel situation. Indeed the court
found an affirmative duty, in this case, on the part of the mortgagees to
inquire into the authority, vel non, of the trustee to incumber part of the
trust corpus. In an action for an accounting, a co-trustee, co-beneficiary
is a party who can properly bring the suit,49 and is under an affirmative
obligation to do so where there may have been misappropriation of trust
funds.
An example of a finding of an abuse of discretion on the part of a
44. FLA. STAT. § 192.35-.50 (1965).
45. 164 So.2d 549 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
46. 174 So.2d 443 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965).
47. FLA. STAT. ch. 689 (1965).
48. 167 So.2d 740 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964).
49. Payiasis v. Robillard, 171 So.2d 630 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
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trustee of a discretionary testamentary trust was presented in In re True's
Trust.5 For a gross abuse of his discretion or other conduct inconsistent
with his continued performance as a trustee, a trustee can be removed,
as can a guardian of the interest of a minor beneficiary. But the mere
appearance of the beneficiary and his guardian as adverse parties in a
proceeding connected with the guardianship, is by itself an inadequate
basis for removal of the guardian on the grounds of hostility."
IV. SUCCESSION
A. Formal Requisites
1. ATTESTATION AND SIGNING OF A WILL
Section 731.07, subsections (1) and (2), requires that the testator
either sign a will personally, or direct another to subscribe his name in his
presence. In either event two witnesses must attest to the genuineness of
the signature at the time of the signing. When the testator has directed
that another should sign his name, the one so directed can also satisfy
the requirement of an attesting witness despite the fact that his name
appears solely as that of a party directed to sign for the testator. 2
The adequacy of the testator's signature arose in a series of "X"
cases in the third district. In three instances, the court refused probate
to wills on the ground that the testator had not signed his name, but
had instead merely placed an "X" where the signature should have been."
The result was predicated upon an interpretation of the statutory term,
"sign," '54 which characterized it as requiring a "full signature." As indi-
cated in the dissent of Judge Hendry of the third district, the result is a
poor one. 55 The only justification for such a result would be the preven-
tion of fraud which is far more appropriately assured by the attestations
of the witnesses.
When the attesting witness is essential to the satisfaction of the
requirement of two subscribing witnesses, any bequest in his behalf is
valid only to the extent to which that witness would have taken if the
will were not established. The designation of one as a recipient of a mere
legal interest as a trustee, by a provision of the will does not bring such
person within the category of interested witnesses; a beneficial interest
50. 158 So.2d 571 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
51. Rosen v. Rosen, 167 So.2d 70 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
52. In re Lomineck's Estate, 155 So.2d 561 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1963).
53. In re Levitt's Estate, 172 So.2d 466 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965); In re Zarkey's Estate,
172 So.2d 465 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965); In re William's Estate, 172 So.2d 464 (Fla. 3d Dist.
1965).
54. FLA. STAT. § 731.07(1) (1965).
55. In re Levitt's Estate, supra note 53, at 466-468. In a caustic reversing opinion,
rendered subsequent to the period covered by this Survey, the supreme court concluded
that an "X" was sufficient. In re William's Estate, 182 So.2d 10 (Fla. 1965).
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must be involved for these rules to apply. 6 An interesting discussion of
the rules relating to these requirements of disinterested witnesses arose in
In re Lubee's Estate.7 There had been three attesting witnesses to the
signing of this will, but two of them, including the residuary legatee, were
interested witnesses. From an order declaring that legatee's interest void,
the residuary legatee appealed, raising three arguments; all were rejected.
His first contention was that there were two disinterested witnesses to this
particular bequest, as he alone was the residuary legatee. Moreover, he
argued that the savings provision of section 731.07(5) applied to the
residuary legatee. Pointing out that both arguments avoided the apparent
intent of these provisions, the court declared that (1) the witnesses were
required to witness the entire will, and (2) the savings clause was only
effective to save the interest of those who would have taken at intestacy,
not to save the interests of those, as the appellant, who would have taken
by a prior will, but not by intestacy. The third argument raised by the
appellant was that the doctrine of dependent relative revocation would
apply to save his interest. Rejecting this argument under the facts of
the case, the court pointed out that the doctrine is merely a presumption
of presumed intent, one which was not sustained on the facts of the case
before them, which included an express provision in this will revoking
a prior will under which the appellant sought to sustain his bequest.
2. NUNCUPATIVE WILL
A nuncupative will, in order to be valid, must have been declared
during the "last sickness" of the decedent in the presence of three wit-
nesses whose presence was requested by the decedent. 8 An issue of when
the decedent's last sickness occurs was raised in In re Vaugh's Estate.59
There the deceased declared his testamentary desires in the presence of
three witnesses during his terminal illness just prior to being taken to
the hospital. On the way to the hospital, the deceased lapsed into a
comatose condition and died six days later without regaining conscious-
ness. The first district court, in affirming that the decedent's nuncupative
will conformed to the statutory requirement that it be declared during his
"last sickness," adopted the view that there is sufficient compliance with
the statute if the sickness has progressed to a point where the testator
expects death at any time, is liable to die at any time and in fact, does
die from such sickness.60
56. In re Koop's Estate, 142 So.2d 693 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962).
57. 142 So.2d 130 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962).
58. FLA. STAT. § 731.06 (1965).
59. 165 So.2d 241 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1964).
60. There are apparently three views on the issue of when a testator has executed a
nuncupative will complying with the statutory requirement that it be declared during his
final illness:
1. Some courts require that the declaration be made at a time when the testator





A testator must possess a sound mind in order to have the mental
capacity necessary to execute a valid will.6 ' The term "sound mind" con-
notes the ability of the testator to understand, in a general way, the
nature and extent of the property to be disposed of, his relationship to
those who would naturally claim a substantial benefit from the will, and
the practical effect of the will as executed.62 Mere old age, physical frailty,
sickness, failing memory or vacillating judgment are not inconsistent
with testamentary capacity if the testamentary prerequisites were pos-
sessed by the testator." This rule holds especially true where the will
is fair and does not provide for an unnatural disposition of the property."
The above principles were applied in In re Dunson's Estate65 where
the court held that the testatrix had the requisite mental capacity to
execute a will despite the fact that she died at the age of seventy-nine from
brain cancer five months after executing the will, and despite the fact
that she was declared mentally incompetent two days before her death.
A question of whether the use of narcotics deprived a testator of the
requisite mental capacity to execute a will was raised in In re Witt's
Estate66 where the testatrix took narcotics to ease the pain of terminal
cancer under her tongue. The court held that the use of narcotics does
not necessarily deprive a testator of testamentary capacity. The court
further stated that a testator could possess the requisite testamentary
capacity even though it was proven that he was somewhat under the
influence of drugs at the time he executed his will.
4. UNDUE INFLUENCE
When a substantial beneficiary under a will is active in its procure-
ment and there exists a confidential relationship between the beneficiary
and testator, a presumption arises that the will was the product of undue
influence.67 However, the mere existence of a confidential relationship
between the parties is not sufficient to raise the presumption of undue
influence, nor is such a relationship sufficient to cast the burden of proving
the absence of undue influence upon the proponent of the will. 8
2. Other courts hold that the declaration is sufficient, if at the time of its utterance,
the testator supposed that his present illness would prove fatal.
3. The Florida court adhered to the view stated in the text which accompanies
this note.
See Annot. 9 A.L.R. 462 (1920).
61. FLA. STAT. § 731.04 (1965).
62. In re Dunson's Estate, 141 So.2d 601 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962).
63. Butler v. Williams, 141 So.2d 4 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962).
64. In re Dunson's Estate, supra note 62.
65. Ibid.
66. 139 So.2d 904 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962).
67. In re Joiner's Estate, 156 So.2d 161 (Fla. 1963). Accord, In re Schor's Estate, 172
So.2d 888 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
68. In re Joiner's Estate, supra note 67.
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Before a will can be invalidated upon the ground of undue influence,
the influence must be such that it amounts to overpersuasion, duress,
force, coercion or artful or fraudulent contrivances to such an extent
that there is a destruction of the free agency and willpower of the testator.
Mere affection, kindness or attachment of one person for another may not
of itself constitute undue influence.69 The court will, however, consider
all of the facts in the case in order to determine whether undue influence
has been exerted. Direct evidence is unnecessary because the existence of
undue influence may be established by circumstantial evidence.70 The
court in In re Reid's Estate,7' for instance, considered such factors as
the attorney's social activities with the testatrix, his business associations
with her, and testimony of the subscribing witnesses to the will, before
it determined that undue influence had been exerted.
The degree of proof necessary to rebut a presumption of undue in-
fluence varies in each factual situation but:
A much higher degree of proof is required to overcome an in-
ference of undue influence where the testator is shown to have
impaired mental powers or clouded intellect than where the
testator is strong mentally and in good health. 2
5. CONTRACTS TO MAKE A WILL
In Hagan v. Laragione,7" James Mele and his wife, Alice Mele, en-
tered into an oral agreement to execute mutual wills which by its terms
provided that the surviving sole beneficiary of the other's will agreed to
devise his entire estate to the brothers and sisters of James Mele. The
alleged oral agreement was purported to have been made between 1948
and 1951, or in the alternative, on or about September 5, 1958. James died
in August 1960. Before Alice died in September 1960, she remarried and
executed a new will which devised and bequeathed her entire estate to
her second husband. This latter will was admitted to probate and the
brothers and sisters of James Mele brought the instant suit for specific
performance of the oral agreement. To this suit, the defendant inter-
posed the following defenses: that section 731.051 of the Florida Statutes
precluded an action on the oral contract to execute mutual wills; that
the portion of the agreement relating to the promise to convey real
property, which constituted the largest part of the estate, was violative
of sections 689.01 and 725.01 of the Florida Statutes, which require
conveyances or contracts to convey reality to be in writing; that the
action was barred by the one year provision of section 725.01 of the
Florida Statutes; and, that the surviving second spouse was entitled to
69. In re Dunson's Estate, 141 So.2d 601 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962).
70. In re Reid's Estate, 138 So.2d 342 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962).
71. 138 So.2d 342 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962).
72. In re Reid's Estate, 138 So.2d 342, 349 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962).
73. 170 So.2d 69 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964).
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the estate as a pretermitted spouse under section 731.10 of the Florida
Statutes. The trial court entered an order striking all of these defenses,
and the defendant prosecuted an interlocutory appeal. The district court,
in affirming the trial court's order, held that section 731.051 of the
Florida Statutes, which became effective on January 1, 1958 and which
provides that all agreements to execute a will in order to be enforceable
must be in writing and signed in the presence of two subscribing wit-
nesses, was not applicable to the agreement if it was executed between
1948 and 1951 because the statute as it related to agreements prior to
January 1, 1958 had been declared unconstitutional as an impairment of
contract rights.74 The court held that the statute was not applicable even
if the agreement had been entered into on September 5, 1958 because
the agreement was partially performed, and partial performance removed
the contract from the operation of the statute. The court went on to
hold that the doctrine of partial performance excluded the contract from
the sanctions of sections 689.01 and 725.01 of the Florida Statutes. In
holding that the one year provision of 725.01 was not applicable to the
contract, the court reasoned that if a contract is susceptible of being
performed within one year, and no time is agreed upon for performance,
then it is not within the Statute of Frauds because either party might have
died within the one year. The court concluded by holding that although
a surviving wife would have been entitled to a dower interest, there is no
corresponding right of curtesy in Florida for the benefit of the husband.
Where the oral agreement to perform services for the remainder of
the decedent's life in exchange for a promise to make a will is entered
into outside the State of Florida, the Florida forum will look to the place
of its execution in order to determine the contract's validity. This result
obtained in Buenger v. Kennedy7" which also involved an issue of the
applicability of section 95.11(7)(b) of the Florida Statutes to suits in
quantum meruit. The court held that suits in quantum meruit for
the recovery of wages for services rendered are governed by section
95.11(7) (b), which bars an action for wages earned more than one year
prior to the commencement of the suit.
B. Interests Arising out of the Marital Tie
A number of cases during the surveyed period additionally defined
the nature of the survivorship interests arising out of the marital tie.
Upon the death of the husband, a widow, in Florida, can accede to an
interest in the estate of her late husband in one of three ways. She can
take either under a will, or under the laws of descent and distribution"6
74. Keith v. Culp, 111 So.2d 278 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1959).
75. 151 So.2d 463 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963).
76. FLA. STAT. § 731.23(1) (1965):
The real and personal property of an intestate shall descend and be distributed as
follows:
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where. there is no valid will, or elect" to take a dower interest 78 if she
is unsatisfied with the share she would have taken under the will or by
intestacy, whichever the case may be. The surviving husband, of course,
can take under the will or by operation of the laws of descent and distri-
bution,79 although he cannot elect curtesy, since that interest is no longer
recognized in Florida.
In order for the surviving spouse to take any of these interests, it
must be established that there was a marital relationship in existence at
the time of the death of the other spouse. In several cases during the
surveyed period, the courts dealt with fact patterns which presented the
issue of a sufficient marital relationship.
The equitable doctrine of estoppel was thrice interposed to bar a
claimant who was a legal spouse of the decedent. The basis for the
estoppel was clear in each instance. In Mason v. Mason,8" the wife had
abandoned divorce proceedings without the knowledge of her husband,
had stood by silently while he entered into another "marriage" with a
second woman, and then attempted to assert an intestate interest in
property which the husband and his second "wife" had taken "in the
entireties." The estoppel asserted, however, was collateral rather than
direct, in that the rationale employed by the court was that the wife
succeeded to the interest of her husband, who was himself estopped
from denying the validity of the subsequent marriage. In In re Moye's
Estate,81 estoppel was utilized to bar a widow who had deserted her
husband, and then herself entered into a bigamous second marriage.
Finally, in Nedd v. Starry,82 a husband, who had deserted his wife and
subsequently had entered into two bigamous marriages, was estopped
from asserting an interest in the estate of his wife. The analysis of the
Chancellor below was restated approvingly by the first district as rep-
resenting the correct Florida position.8"
[While] adultery, or even a subsequent bigamous marriage does
not ipso facto estop a surviving spouse from asserting a right
in or arising out of the estate of the deceased spouse or from
claiming death benefits arising out of the relationship of husband
and wife, . . . misconduct of a flagrant and inexcusable char-
acter evincing an abandonment and repudiation of the marriage
(1) To the surviving spouse and lineal descendents, the surviving spouse taking the
same as if he or she were one of the children.
77. FLA. STAT. § 731.35 (1965).
78. FLA. STAT. § 731.34 (1965).
79. FLA. STAT. § 731.23(1) (1965).
80. 174 So.2d 620 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963).
81. 160 So.2d 620 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963).
82. 143 So.2d 522 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962).
83. Both courts reviewed the previous decisions in the area: Doherty v. Traxler, 66
So.2d 274 (Fla. 1953); Quinn v. Miles, 124 So.2d 883 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1960); Kreisel v.
Ingham, 113 So.2d 205 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1959); Perkins v. Richards Constr., Inc., 111 So.2d
494 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1959).
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obligations will operate to estop one from enjoying such rights
or may constitute a basis for application of the doctrine of un-
clean hands."4
Section 733.20(d) (i) of Florida Statutes makes provision for inter-
mediate family allowance to sustain a family in the period between the
loss of the breadwinner and such time as final settlement or award can be
determined and effecuated.8 5 In determining whether or not to afford
such relief the courts have been less than prospective in setting standards
whereby a case may be pre-evaluated;"8 however, it is clear that general
equity principles do apply. Moreover, the relief has been likened to the
temporary alimony award, and cases in that area might prove helpful.8"
An interesting factual situation, involving both the family allowance
provisions and dower was presented in Levine v. Feuer.88 In a non-jury
proceeding to determine an alleged widow's right to a family allowance,
the trial judge ruled that the woman was not the widow of the decedent.
When the same woman subsequently sought to elect dower, the executor
successfully moved to strike the purported election on the ground that
the issue of the woman's relation to the decedent had already been de-
termined adversely to her by the county judge. On appeal, the third
district reversed the order below, pointing out the express provision for
determination by jury of all factual issues relating to dower," and re-
jecting the contention that the petition for family allowance, which had
placed the issue of the marital relationship before the county judge, could
act as a bar or waiver of that right of determination by jury.
When the testator's will was made prior to his marriage to the sur-
viving spouse, the survivor is pretermitted and deemed entitled to an
intestate share.90 The requisites of this statutory provision are: (1) a
valid will executed prior to the marriage; (2) the subsequent marriage;
(3) the death of the testator; and (4) the surviving spouse. Once these
requisites are shown, there are a number of practical considerations in-
volved in the determination of the exceptions to this rule. These were
first considered in Florida in In re Livingston's Estate."1 Here the court
imposed an additional burden on one seeking the benefit of the statute,
a requirement that the claimant demonstrate the absence of a provision
in the will on his behalf. The rule announced is contrary to a shifting
84. 143 So.2d, at 524.
85. This discretionary relief was refused in In re Anderson's Estate, 149 So.2d 65 (Fla.
2d Dist. 1963), and therein described with relation to the equities, or lack of equities, in-
volved.
86. See the dictum in In re Anderson's Estate, id. at 68.
87. Id. at 67.
88. 152 So.2d 784 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963).
89. FLA. STAT. § 733.12(3) (1965).
90. FLA. STAT. § 731.10 (1965).
91. 172 So.2d 619 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965).
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burden of proof employed under similar statutes in New York92 and
California. 3
If a will is made while there is a marriage, and the parties subse-
quently divorce, any provision for the surviving former spouse ceases to
be effective at the point of the divorce, 4 and a subsequent remarriage
between the same two parties will not revive the provision, but will
render the survivor pretermitted 5 An interesting factual variation on
this theme was presented by Conascenta v. Giordano." Here the parties
were living together at the time the will was executed, subsequently re-
married and were later divorced. It later appeared, however, that the
decedent had already been married prior to the whole relationship with
the claimant, and had never been divorced therefrom. In denying effect
to a provision for the claimant under decedent's will, the court chose,
as its basis, the putative divorce, despite the void nature of the putative
marital status. In so doing the court rejected what it considered an un-
reasonable, although literal interpretation of the statute in deference to
the overriding legislative intent.
Where a widow decides to elect dower, she will not be barred by a
prior acceptance of benefits under the will, so long as she revokes the
benefits and her acceptance has not induced action by third parties as
would justify estoppel.97 Where the widow does so elect, she cannot take
a provision in the will on her behalf, even if the provision was made
prior to marriage and in satisfaction of a debt.9"
In 1959, the Legislature amended section 731.35, altering, under
certain circumstances, the time within which the widow must make her
election of dower.99 In two cases, the first and second districts reached
different results regarding the retroactive affect of this amendment. In
Martz v. Riskamm,100 the first district refused to preclude a widow's
election where it would have been barred by operation of the provisions
in effect at the death of the decedent, on the grounds that the Legislature
could extend the period for election inasmuch as the widow had not yet
lost her right at the time of the amendment. But in In re Roger's Estate,'0
the second district refused to revive a right of election which had expired
prior to the amendment, despite circumstances which would have rendered
her election timely under the new provisions.
92. In re Snopek's Estate, 249 App. Div. 396, 292 N.Y. Supp. 359 (1937); In re Van
Hoecke's Will, 197 Misc. 339, 93 N.Y.S.2d 19 (Surrog. Ct. 1949).
93. In re Corker's Estate, 87 Cal. 643, 25 Pac. 922 (1891).
94. FLA. STAT. § 731.101 (1965).
95. Bauer v. Reese, 161 So.2d 678 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1964).
96. 143 So.2d 682 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962).
97. In re Coffey's Estate, 171 So.2d 568 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
98. In re Saperstein's Estate, 158 So.2d 538 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963).
99. See discussion in text accompanying note 13, supra.
100. 144 So.2d 83 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1962).




Adoption and the rights coincidental to it are regulated by statute
in Florida."0 2 Included among the rights of adoption is the statutory right
of an unmarried adult to adopt another adult.'0 3 However, an adopted
adult is not entitled, under the pretermitted heir statute,0 4 to inherit
from the adopting unmarried adult. This latter conclusion was reached in
Tsilidis v. Pedakis°5 where the first district court denied the adopted
adult's claim under the pretermitted heir statute on the theory that Chap-
ter 72 of the Florida Statutes is in derogation of the common law and
must therefore be strictly construed. It should be noted, however, that in
1963 the legislature amended section 72.34 of the Florida Statutes, which
provided for adoption of adults, so that now, a court faced with the factual
situation in Tsilidis would reach a conclusion opposite to that arrived at
by the first district.
An adopted child may not inherit from collateral adoptive relatives."0 "
But the adopted child may inherit from his natural collateral blood
kindred.'
In a case of first impression, 08 the second district court of appeal
has held that a child adopted after the execution of the will is a preter-
mitted heir within the statutory meaning of section 731.11 of the Florida
Statutes. The court considered that the legislature intended pretermitted
child statutes to apply to the situation where a child0 9 is adopted after
the execution of a will, especially since the legislature had clothed adopted
children with all of the rights and benefits of a natural child.
Is an adopted child a lineal descendant within the meaning of the
Florida anti-lapse statute?"0 A very recent second district court case
has announced an affirmative answer to this question."' In concluding
that the adopted daughter was entitled to her father's share under his
deceased aunt's will, the court, in this first impression case, stated that the
anti-lapse statute does not require that the person ultimately taking be a
lineal descendant of the testator but only that he be a lineal descendant of
the legatee or devisee named in the will.
102. FLA. STAT. §§ 72.07-72.40 (1965).
103. FLA. STAT. § 72.34 (1965).
104. FLA. STAT. § 731.11 (1965).
105. 132 So.2d 9 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1961).
106. FLA. STAT. § 731.30 (1965).
107. In re Levy's Estate, 141 So.2d 803 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962).
108. In re Frizzell's Estate, 156 So.2d 558 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963).
109. It should be noted that in the case of an adopted adult the rule may be different.
See Tsilidis v. Pedakis, 132 So.2d 9 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1961) and text accompanying note 105.
110. FLA. STAT. § 731.20 (1965).
111. In re Baker's Estate, 172 So.2d 268 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965) noted in 20 U. MiMn
L. REv. 461 (1965).
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D. Advancements
An advancement consists of property given to a next of kin in his
lifetime, and its value is fixed as of the time of the advancement."
2
E. Insurance Proceeds
When there is no specific bequest in the will, regarding proceeds from
insurance policies which are payable to the decedent's estate, and the
decedent leaves no surviving spouse or child, should the proceeds be
distributed to the sole beneficiary under the will or should the proceeds
be distributed according to the intestate laws of descent and distribution?
This question was answered in Thomas v. Nuckols"n where the first
district reversed a holding by the trial court that the proceeds should be
distributed under the laws of intestate succession. The district court
applied section 222.13, which provides for the disposition of proceeds
from life insurance policies. Since the decedent left neither a surviving
child nor a surviving spouse, the court determined that the insurance
proceeds should be paid to the personal representative and that they
should constitute a part of the assets of the estate to be distributed in
accordance with the directions in the will.
The first district court in In re Alworth's Estate" 4 held that section
222.13 was also intended by the legislature to be a statute of descent and
distribution. Thus, the court held that where the decedent leaves a
surviving wife and child, and the proceeds of the life insurance policies
are payable to the executor of the decedent's estate and have not been
specifically bequeathed in the will, the statute dictates that the surviving
wife and child are entitled to the proceeds.
The decedent in Rogers v. Rogers"5 designated his first wife as
beneficiary of his accumulated contributions to the Florida Teacher's
Retirement Fund. Subsequent to this designation, he was divorced from
his first wife and married his present wife. The trial court held that the
second wife was entitled to the fund on the theory that the right to
designate the beneficiary was intended by the legislature to be in the
nature of a testamentary disposition. Therefore, the designation of the
beneficiary was revoked by operation of section 731.101 of the Florida
Statutes, which provides that a divorce renders a will null and void
insofar as it affects the surviving divorced spouse. The first district court
reversed the trial court's decision and held that the benefits accuring to
the designated beneficiary under the Retirement Fund provisions of
section 238.07 of the Florida Statutes are in the nature of proceeds from
112. Livingston v. Crickenberger, 141 So.2d 794 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1962) resting its de-
cision upon FLA. STAT. § 734.07 (1961).
113. 157 So.2d 712 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1963).
114. 151 So.2d 478 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1963).
115. 152 So.2d 183 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1963).
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an annuity or life insurance policy and in the absence of an express pro-
vision to the contrary in the agreement, the benefits are not affected by
the mere fact that the parties are divorced subsequent to the making
of the contract.
F. Will Construction
The intent of the testator remains, once again, the "polestar" for
the courts in cases involving the construction of wills. However, as the
courts work their way through the particularized facts of each will con-
test, very often doctrine and presumption help to point the way.
The doctrine of ejusdem generis was utilized in In re Home's Es-
tate."6 The bequest in question had provided that the sister should get
a ring and "any other personal property that I own that I have not other-
wise disposed of in the will.""' This provision, read in light of a general
residuary clause which followed, was construed, under the doctrine of
ejusdem generis, to speak only of things in the general class of rings,
that class being tangible personalty. The court pointed out, however,
that the doctrine does not apply: (1) where the general words appear in
a general bequest of the estate, or (2) where the words appear in the
residuary clause, or (3) where, because of the absence of a residuary
clause, the goods not included in the scope of the bequest would other-
wise pass by intestacy (the law favoring testacy over intestacy).
When there is conflict over whether a particular bequest is properly
characterized as "specific" or "general," with the commensurate affect
on the order within which they might be defeated, the presumption aiding
the court in its determination is that the bequest is general, rather than
specific.118 The burden of proving otherwise rests upon the party assert-
ing the "specific" characterization.
In another'case the term "to pay" was pivotal in the court's deter-
mination that the bequest, in favor of two non-profit charitable corpora-
tions, was a gift absolute rather than a gift in trust."9 When the testator's
bequest is that of a percentage interest in the estate, the better rule of
construction is that the percentage will be of the net distributable es-
tate.'20 Where a will contained a bequest in favor of "Mr. & Mrs." the
parties each take, with all others within the same bequest, as individual
beneficiaries, rather than as a single unit in the entireties.' 2'
In a rather complicated factual pattern, the court in In re Rentz's
Estate122 pointed out two aspects of the doctrine of the destruction of
116. 171 So.2d 14 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965).
117. Id. at 15.
118. In re Garrison's Estate, 156 So.2d 18 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1963).
119. In re Thourez' Estate, 166 So.2d 476 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964).
120. Aronson v. Congregation Temle de Hirsch, 138 So.2d 69 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962).
121. Dixon v. Davis, 155 So.2d 189 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963).
122. 152 So.2d 480 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963).
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contingent remainders. The doctrine does not apply to personalty, but
only to interest of a real nature. Moreover, for the doctrine to have the
affect of destroying the remainderman interest through merger, the inter-
ests would have to be placed in the hands of a third party since the de-
struction cannot take place by the same instrument, at the same time,
by the same person.
Yet with all of the presumptions, the strength of the search for a
way to fulfill the testator's intent remains as the paramount motivation.
An excellent example of this was afforded in In re Roulston's Estate
123
where, because of peculiar circumstances of the case which established
such testamentary intent, the words "to her use and pleasure as long as
she shall live" was construed to create an interest in fee.
G. Will Contests
In State v. Byington,'24 the county judge upon his own motion, made
after the expiration of the six month period within which objections to
probate had to be filed, entered an Order of Investigation and to Account
which was directed to the executor and prohibited him from dispersing
any estate funds pending the outcome of the investigation. The following
day the county judge, once again upon his own motion, and without notice
or hearing, ordered that the executor show cause why the probate of
the will should not be revoked because of his presumptive exercise of
undue influence, and moreover, why he should not be held in contempt of
court and removed from his post of executor for mismanagement and
for the unauthorized dispersal of estate funds. The executor sought a
writ of prohibition directed against the county judge. In support of the
petition, the executor alleged that the county judge exceeded his juris-
diction by entering the above orders pursuant to his own motions and
that the probate of the will had otherwise become final under the provi-
sions of section 732.28(6) of the Florida Statutes. The executor further
alleged that the county judge was disqualified to act because of his non-
compliance with the automatic retirement provision of the Florida Consti-
tution,12 which requires justices and judges to retire at age 70. The first
district, in denying the petition, held that the county judge was clearly
acting within the scope of his authority when he entered the complained-
of orders. Among the inherent powers of any court is the power to vacate
its own orders, judgments and decrees to prevent abuse, oppression,
injustice, to protect its own jurisdiction, and to correct mistakes and
supply defects in its own decrees. The court further held that section
732.28(6) of the Florida Statutes does not limit the period within which
the probate court may, for good cause shown, exercise its discretionary
123. 142 So.2d 107 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962) (emphasis added).
124. 168 So.2d 164 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1964).
125. FLA. CoxsT. art. V, § 17(1).
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power to vacate a decree admitting a will to probate. The court inter-
preted the statute as being intended to limit the time within which parties
interested in the estate could challenge the validity of a will that had
been offered for probate. As to the allegation that the judge was beyond
retirement age, the court concluded that he was at least a de facto judge,
and that in any event a quo warranto proceeding, and not a writ of pro-
hibition, would have been the proper method of attack.
The petitioners in In re Estes' Estate 26 sought to employ the dis-
covery procedures 1' provided for in the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure
in aid of their will contest. The county judge entered an order denying
discovery. On certiorari, the county judge's order was quashed. The
third district reasoned that the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure were
applicable to a will contest in the county judge's court inasmuch as a
will contest is civil in nature.
One of the beneficiaries in In re Deane's Estate2 " sought to have
the probate of a will revoked on the basis that the attorney-executor had
spoilated the will by the substitution of a different second page. At a
hearing, the beneficiary introduced parol evidence of the testator's declara-
tions in support of his contention that the spoilated paragraphs ran
counter to the testator's long-expressed purposes. The county judge
revoked probate of the spoilated will, reconstructed the provisions spoil-
ated thereby re-establishing the will, and removed the attorney as the
executor. On appeal, the county judge's action was affirmed and a con-
tention that the contestant failed in his burden of proof was rejected. The
appellate court noted that as a general rule in proceedings contesting the
validity of a purported will, the proponent has the burden of proving,
prima facie, the formal execution and attestation of the will, and then,
the contestant must assume the burden of establishing the grounds upon
which he opposes probate by a preponderance of the evidence. The court
held, however, that there is an exception to the normal order of proof
where it is shown that the provisions of the purported will run counter
to the natural affection of the testator or counter to his long-expressed
purposes. The court stated that in such a case the proponent has the
burden of dispelling inherent improbabilities and of proving, by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence, that the purported will is in fact the testa-
tor's freely and voluntarily executed will. In concluding that the propo-
nent attorney-executor failed to sustain his burden of proof, the court
adopted the majority view that where the existence and due execution
of a lost or spoilated will have been proved, and the presumption of
revocation rebutted, parol evidence of the declarations of the testator
is admissible to establish the contents of the lost or spoilated portions.
126. 158 So.2d 794 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963).
127. The petitioner sought requests for admissions, answers to interrogatories, deposi-
tions, and the production of documents.
128. 153 So.2d 26 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963).
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The first district reversed an order admitting an attested holographic
will and codicil to probate for the reason that the county judge predicated
his order upon a supposed presumption of testacy. The district court held
that prior to the will's admission to probate there is no presumption as
to its validity. 29
The plaintiff in Schenkel v. Atlantic Nat'l Bank' sued the executors
of the decedent's estate to recover upon an alleged oral agreement be-
tween herself and the decedent to the effect that the decedent had prom-
ised to bequeath to the plaintiff the equivalent of $200 per month during
the period that the plaintiff rendered personal services to the decedent.
The plaintiff sought to recover $26,400 for services which were rendered
over a period of eleven years. The jury returned an $18,000 verdict for
the plaintiff, but the trial court granted the executors a new trial on the
grounds, inter alia, that it had erred in striking two of the executor's
defenses to the complaint; viz., that the suit was not commenced within
the three year period provided by section 95.11(5) of the Florida Statutes,
and that the alleged contract was not intended by the parties to be per-
formed within a year and was not in writing as required by the Statute
of Frauds. On appeal, the district court held that the two defenses were
properly struck. The court held that where the promise sued upon is
an oral promise to bequeath money, the statute of limitations does
not begin to run until the testatrix' death. In regard to the alleged
defense of the Statute of Frauds, the appellate court reasoned that the
one year provision of section 725.01 of the Florida Statutes was not ap-
plicable because the defendant-executor's decedent might have died
within a year, therefore the contract could have been performed prior to
the expiration of that period of time.
H. Jurisdictional Problems
The jurisdiction of a county judge's court is limited to that expressly
provided by statute or constitution. Those courts have jurisdiction over
strictly probate matters, with the commensurate powers to enforce its
determinations. But the mere fact that an estate is a party to an action
will not vest the county judge with jurisdiction over the action. Thus,
there is no jurisdiction in the county judge to determine title in property
merely because one of the claimants is an estate.'3 ' Moreover, in an
action demanding an accounting by a guardian for alleged activities
which conflicted with the duties of the guardian vis-a-vis his ward, the
county judge was held to have exceeded his jurisdiction where the legal
effect of his order was to create a resulting trust in favor of the ward.18 2
129. In re Nuchol's Estate, 147 So.2d 340 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1962).
130. 141 So.2d 327 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1962).
131. In re O'Neal's Estate, 142 So.2d 315 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962).
132. In re Guardianship of White, 140 So.2d 311 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1962).
[VOL. XX
TRUSTS
The jurisdiction over trust estates and suits to establish trusts belongs
exclusively to courts of equity.
One rather interesting decision considered the general rules which
determine the proper jurisdiction in which a will should be probated. In
Biederman v. Cheatham, 3' the decedent's will had been admitted to
probate in a Florida county judge's court upon a finding that the decedent
had died a domiciliary of Florida. On appeal to the second district, one
issue was whether the location of the testator's property or his domicile
was determinative of jurisdiction for probate. The court aligned Florida
with the current majority position, that the law of the decedent's domicile
at death controls the probate procedure. This rule was announced not-
withstanding a prior determination by another state that the testator
had died domiciled in that forum. The court refused to give that deter-
mination any effect other than that of binding the parties to that prior
determination, by way of collateral estoppel, on the issue of domicile.
In Miller v. Miller,"8 4 the wife of a decedent sought a declaratory
decree to determine her rights under an antenuptal agreement, which
she alleged to be void. The chancellor denied the executor's motion to
dismiss. The executor then took an interlocutory appeal contesting the
jurisdiction of the chancellor to entertain such a plea as well as the suffi-
ciency of the complaint itself. On appeal, the second district held that the
chancellor did have jurisdiction to entertain such a plea, but that there
were insufficient facts to establish a justiciable controversy in that the
wife had not set forth any injury under the agreement. The chancellor's
discretion does not extend to the proffering of legal advice prior to the
present existence of a justiciable controversy, but in view of the strict
requirement that dower be timely elected, a more liberal application of
declaratory relief would appear in order.
I. Timeliness of Claims against the Estate
Section 733.16 of the Florida Statutes, 1965, provides that claims
against the estate of a decedent must be timely brought or they will be
barred.8 5 The period for filing such claims is now six months from the
publication of the first notice to creditors, as a result of a 1961 amend-
ment. So as to equitably preserve claims arising during interim period,
the 1963 Legislature added subsection (3) to 733.16, which established
a period of grace for those claims filed within eight months from publica-
tion to creditors, between July 1, 1961 and July 1, 1963.
133. 161 So.2d 538 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964).
134. 151 So.2d 869 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963).
135. E.g., Simpson v. Simpson, 143 So.2d 707 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1962). The issue arose
on an appeal from an order by the county judge requiring the inclusion of certain outstand-
ing obligations of the decedent, incurred during his lifetime, but not claimed within the
statutory period.
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While none of these legislative amendments were directly at issue,
the surveyed period was an active one for judicial determinations relating
to the issue of timeliness. In In re Moore's Estate,18 6 the court refused to
follow a federal rulel a7 exempting, from no-claim statutes, claims asserted
by the United States in its sovereign capacity. In the Moore case, the
court barred a claim, for lack of timeliness, which had been filed by the
State of Florida. The tolling of the period for filing commences with
the date of the first publication of the notice, not the filing of proof of
publication with the county judge, although the filed proof is prima facie
evidence of the facts stated therein.!3"
The tolling provisions can, of course, be avoided where the claim as-
serted is that of certain equitable interests in the estate. In such instances,
the interest comes within the certain enumerated exceptions to the six
month period set forth in section 733.19.1 In Buck v. McNab, 4 ° the
court reached this result by the employment of the doctrine of equitable
conversion, despite the fact that the claimant was precluded in his attempt
to obtain an order of specific performance of a contract to sell realty
between himself and the decedent. However, the court refused to reach
that result in Staley v. Jackson,' wherein an allegation of conversion
was considered to be inadequate in that it failed to establish any right
of the claimant in specific property as required by section 733.19. With-
out an interest of that identifiable nature, the claimant was relegated to
the position of a general creditor, notwithstanding the equitable nature
of his claim.
J. Personal Liability of the Beneficiary
The plaintiff and defendant in Kittel v. Simmonite 42 were entitled
to share equally in an estate. The defendant was the administrator of the
estate and was also the plaintiff's legal advisor. The defendant advised
the plaintiff concerning the distribution of the estate and obtained the
plaintiff's consent to it. Nine months after the entry of the orders of
distribution and of discharge, the plaintiff brought suit against the
defendant individually. The plaintiff alleged that the distribution was not
equal and was more favorable to the defendant. He therefore sought
compensatory and punitive damages for the loss sustained. The trial
court dismissed the amended complaint on the ground that such an action
could not be maintained as long as the probate orders remained in effect.
On appeal, the third district reversed the order of dismissal since the
136. 145 So.2d 293 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1962).
137. United States v. Summerlin, 310 U.S. 414 (1940).
138. McKinney v. Sill, 153 So.2d 354 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1963).
139. [T]he provisions of this section shall not be construed to prevent the enforce-
ment of mortgages, pledges, liens or claims to specific property, real or personal.
140. 139 So.2d 734 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962).
141. 154 So.2d 349 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963).
142. 152 So.2d 817 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963).
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action was against the defendant in his capacity as an individual, and
not in his capacity as an administrator; therefore, it could be maintained
even though the probate orders remained in effect because the action
did not challenge the orders of the probate court.
